\u3ci\u3ePadilla V. Kentucky:\u3c/i\u3e  Bending Over Backward for Fairness in Noncitizen Criminal Proceedings by Syre, Alison
Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 20
Issue 2




Padilla V. Kentucky: Bending Over Backward for
Fairness in Noncitizen Criminal Proceedings
Alison Syre
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation




PADILLA V. KENTUCKY: BENDING OVER 
BACKWARD FOR FAIRNESS IN 
NONCITIZEN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
Alison Syré 
INTRODUCTION 
Zhong Lin was born in China, but has lived in the United 
States for most of his adult life.1 Until 2007, Mr. Lin lived with 
his wife and two children, ages eleven and nine, all three of 
whom are United States citizens.2 He had strong business 
interests in the United States, as well as family and community 
ties, but never became a U.S. citizen.3 Mr. Lin considers 
himself to be entirely American, and sees China merely his 
place of birth.4 In 2007, Mr. Lin was charged with one count of 
conspiracy to commit tax fraud.5 Upon the advice of his 
attorney, he entered into a plea agreement, under which he 
agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a sentence of one year of 
probation, restitution payments to the IRS, and a fine.6 Mr. Lin 
fulfilled each element of his sentence, but his attorney failed to 
                                                 
 J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2013; B.A. University of 
Wisconsin–Madison, 2008. The author would like to thank her family and 
friends for their support during the writing process. She also wholeheartedly 
thanks the members of the Journal of Law & Policy for their stellar efforts in 
preparing this Note for publication, and James Fox, Esq. for sparking her 
interest in this topic. 
1 United States v. Zhong Lin, No. 3:07-CR-44-H, 2011 WL 197206, at 
*3 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 20, 2011). 
2 Id. at *1, *3. 
3 Id. at *3. 
4 See id. 
5 Id. at *1. 
6 Id. at *1, *3. 
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tell him one very important thing: his guilty plea would render 
him deportable.7  
Roselva Chaidez’s story has many similarities. Ms. Chaidez 
is a lawful permanent resident from Mexico, who entered the 
United States in 1971.8 She is a fifty-four-year-old grandmother 
of three, all United States citizens.9 In 2003, she had been living 
in northern Illinois for more than twenty-five years.10 That year, 
Ms. Chaidez was charged with multiple counts of mail fraud.11 
With the advice of counsel, she pled guilty to two of the counts, 
and was sentenced to four years probation and ordered to pay 
restitution and a fine.12 In 2009, Ms. Chaidez’s citizenship 
petition was denied, and the Department of Homeland Security 
placed her in removal proceedings based on her mail fraud 
conviction.13 For her plea, Ms. Chaidez “forfeited her right to a 
trial and ultimately her privilege of remaining a free and lawful 
permanent resident, living in the only society she knows.”14 Like 
Mr. Lin, Ms. Chaidez’s attorney did not inform her that her 
plea would render her deportable.15 
Mr. Lin and Ms. Chaidez both challenged their guilty pleas 
following the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Padilla v. 
Kentucky,16 which held that the failure to inform a defendant of 
the potential immigration consequences of pleading guilty 
                                                 
7 See id. at *2 (crediting Lin’s testimony that he “entered into his plea 
agreement based upon mistaken legal advice only recently revealed”). 
8 Brief of Defendant-Appellee at *3, Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 






14 Id. at *8–9. 
15 Id. at *7–8. 
16 See generally United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d 896, 898 
(N.D. Ill. 2010), rev’d 654 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011); Motion to Withdraw 
Plea of Guilty and Set Aside Judgment of Conviction and Sentence, United 
States v. Zhong Lin, No. 07CR00044, 2010 WL 6510225 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 
19, 2010) [hereinafter Motion to Withdraw Plea]. 
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constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.17 Despite their 
nearly identical circumstances, however, the courts hearing their 
petitions came to vastly different outcomes due to a difference in 
opinion regarding whether Padilla applied retroactively.18 Mr. 
Lin filed a writ of coram nobis to challenge his federal 
conviction in the Western District of Kentucky.19 Judge Heyburn 
of that court determined that Padilla applied retroactively and, 
accordingly, could provide relief for Mr. Lin, even though it 
was decided after Mr. Lin’s conviction became final.20 Judge 
Heyburn granted Mr. Lin’s petition for coram nobis, and Mr. 
Lin is now free to continue living in the United States.21 Ms. 
Chaidez also filed a writ of coram nobis,22 which was initially 
granted by Judge Gottschall in the Northern District of Illinois.23 
On appeal in the Seventh Circuit, however, a two-judge majority 
found Padilla did not apply retroactively, making relief 
unavailable to individuals such as Ms. Chaidez, whose 
convictions had already become final.24 The ruling maintained 
Ms. Chaidez’s conviction, as well as her deportable status.  One 
can imagine that, had Ms. Chaidez been living in Western 
Kentucky, rather than Northern Illinois, her case may have 
turned out very differently.  
Deportation may be the most severe part of the penalty that 
can be imposed on noncitizen defendants.25 Yet, until Padilla, 
                                                 
17 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010). 
18 See Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 694 (7th Cir. 2011); 
United States v. Zhong Lin, No. 3:07-CR-44-H, 2011 WL 197206, at *1–2 
(W.D. Ky. Jan. 20, 2011). 
19 See generally Motion to Withdraw Plea, supra note 16. 
20 Id. at *1–2. 
21 Id. at *3. 
22 United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d 896, 898 (N.D. Ill. 2010), 
rev’d, 654 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011). 
23 Id. at 904. 
24 Id. at 694. Judge Williams dissented, framing Padilla as an application 
of an old rule (Strickland) to new facts. Id. at 694–96 (Williams, J., 
dissenting). Since Judge Williams was one of only three judges considering 
Ms. Chaidez’ petition, the result was essentially dictated by the fact that one 
way of framing Padilla’s rule got one more vote than another. See id. 
25  Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010). 
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most courts considered deportation a “collateral consequence” of 
a guilty plea, which an attorney had no duty to discuss with her 
client.26 It is clear that, post-Padilla, defendants who do not 
receive immigration advice from counsel before entering a guilty 
plea have a viable claim with which they may challenge their 
conviction.27 It is unclear, however, whether defendants whose 
convictions became final before Padilla (such as Mr. Lin and 
Ms. Chaidez), will also reap the benefit of the Padilla decision. 
The Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of the 
retroactive application of Padilla, and it appears unlikely that it 
will do so in the near future.28 Thus, it is imperative that lower 
courts correctly interpret Padilla to apply retroactively, as this 
interpretation is most accurate and helps correct the injustice 
suffered by ill-informed and uninformed noncitizen defendants. 
This Note argues that an accurate application of Padilla 
requires courts to properly frame the rule of Padilla so as to 
apply the decision retroactively. Part IA provides an overview of 
recent changes to the relationship between criminal and 
immigration law, as well as a summary of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Padilla v. Kentucky.29 Part IB explores the question 
of Padilla’s retroactive applicability and the potentially 
substantial consequences of the slight variation in courts’ 
framing of Padilla’s rule.30 Part IC examines the reasoning of 
courts that have arrived at contradictory interpretations of the 
rule.31 Part II recommends two ways for courts to properly apply 
Padilla to ensure that defendants whose convictions became final 
                                                 
26 See infra Part I. 
27 Defendants convicted in federal courts challenge their convictions 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Act of June 25, 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006). 
Defendants convicted in state court may do so under state post-conviction 
relief statutes, see, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10 (McKinney 2005), 
and under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 once they have exhausted their state remedies. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 
28 The Supreme Court denied certiorari on a case presenting the issue of 
Padilla’s retroactivity as recently as October 2011. See Commonwealth v. 
Morris, 705 S.E.2d 503 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 115 (2011). 
29 See infra Part IA. 
30 See infra Part IB. 
31 See infra Part IC. 
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before the decision realize the benefits of Padilla. Part IIA gives 
several reasons why it is more appropriate for courts to frame 
Padilla’s rule as “the right to effective counsel”; Part IIB 
discusses state courts’ unique ability to give broader effect to 
Padilla, even if it is deemed “nonretroactive” under federal 
standards; and Part IIC assures that neither option will greatly 
disrupt interests of finality.32 The Note concludes that it is 
incumbent upon courts to apply Padilla retroactively and to 
correct the harm to noncitizens whose lives have been upended 
by their counsels’ failure. 
I. THE PADILLA LANDSCAPE AND THE QUESTION OF 
RETROACTIVITY 
Before 2010, most courts recognized a distinction between 
the criminal and civil consequences of criminal convictions in 
the case of a non-citizen defendant.33 The specific elements of a 
defendant’s sentence were considered criminal or “direct” 
consequences, whereas the deportation implications of a criminal 
conviction were considered civil or “collateral” consequences.34 
The latter were considered outside the scope of representation 
required by the Sixth Amendment.35 Thus, the failure of a 
defense attorney to advise his or her client of any civil 
consequence of a criminal conviction was not grounds for an 
ineffective counsel claim.36 
Two pieces of legislation—The Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)37 and the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
                                                 
32 See infra Part II. 
33 Daniel Kanstroom, Padilla v. Kentucky and the Evolving Right to 
Deportation Counsel: Watershed or Work-in-Progress?, 45 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 305, 307 (2011). 
34 Id. 
35 United States v. Fry, 322 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003). 
36 Id. 
37 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in 
scattered titles of U.S.C.). 
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(“IIRIRA”)38—created even more overlap between criminal law 
and civil immigration law. Both dramatically expanded the list 
of deportable criminal offenses and eliminated judicial discretion 
over certain types of deportation orders.39 In the wake of this 
legislation, deportation is often a virtually automatic result of 
criminal conviction.40 Additionally, AEDPA and IIRIRA apply 
retroactively, rendering deportable countless noncitizens that 
were charged and convicted at a time when deportation was less 
than a remote possibility.41 These results have led many to 
complain that the laws are unduly harsh.42 
A. Padilla v. Kentucky 
In its 2010 decision in Padilla v. Kentucky,43 the United 
States Supreme Court took a significant step in addressing the 
overlap between criminal and civil consequences, acknowledging 
the unworkable nature of the “direct” versus “collateral” 
                                                 
38 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in 
scattered sections of 8, 18, 28 U.S.C.). 
39 Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the 
Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 99–100 (1998). 
40 Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: 
Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
1889, 1891 (2000). 
41 See Morawetz, supra note 39, at 97, 99; see also Andrew Moore, 
Criminal Deportation, Post-Conviction Relief and the Lost Cause of 
Uniformity, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 665, 708–09 (2008) (“[D]ue to the 
retroactive nature of the grounds of deportation expanded in 1996, non-
citizens who pled guilty many years ago will now face immigration 
consequences if the government becomes aware of their past offenses.”). 
42 See, e.g., Amy Langenfeld, Living in Limbo: Mandatory Detention of 
Immigrants Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 
1996, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1041 (1999); Morawetz, supra note 39, at 97. The 
effects of these laws may be felt most strongly by certain groups. See Pooja 
Gehi, Struggles from the Margins: Anti-Immigrant Legislation and the Impact 
on Low-Income Transgender People of Color, 30 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 315 
(2009); Claire A. Smearman, Second Wives’ Club: Mapping the Impact of 
Polygamy in U.S. Immigration Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 382 (2009). 
43 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
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distinction.44 In that case, Jose Padilla, a native of Honduras and 
a Vietnam War veteran, who had been a lawful permanent 
resident of the United States for more than forty years, pled 
guilty to drug charges.45 As a result, Padilla faced mandatory 
deportation under U.S. immigration law.46 In post-conviction 
proceedings, Padilla alleged that his counsel had “not only failed 
to advise him of [deportation consequences] prior to entering his 
plea, but also told him that he ‘did not have to worry about 
immigration status since he had been in the country so long.’”47 
Padilla claimed that, were it not for his counsel’s erroneous 
advice, he would have insisted on going to trial,48 and he thereby 
challenged the plea’s validity under the ineffective counsel test 
of Strickland v. Washington.49 According to Strickland, a 
defendant may challenge the validity of his guilty plea on the 
basis of ineffective assistance of counsel by showing “that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning 
as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment. . . . [And] that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense.”50 
The Supreme Court found that, under Strickland, the failure 
of Padilla’s counsel to inform Padilla of the immigration 
consequences of pleading guilty rendered counsel’s performance 
constitutionally deficient.51 The Court found the distinction 
between “direct” and “collateral” consequences ill suited for the 
case because of the close connection between deportation and the 
criminal process.52 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens 
explained that defense counsel had an obligation to inform 
                                                 
44 See id. at 1482. 
45 Id. at 1477. 
46 Id.; see also Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006). 
47 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 253 S.W.3d 
482, 483 (Ky. 2008)). 
48 Id. 
49 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
50 Id. at 687. 
51 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482–83. 
52 Id. at 1482. 
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clients of the possible deportation consequences of their plea.53 
Failure to do so, the Court held, provided the defendant the 
basis for a claim of ineffective counsel under Strickland.54 In 
arriving at this conclusion, the Court considered the changing 
landscape of federal immigration law over the last ninety years, 
and noted that  
[w]hile once there was only a narrow class of deportable 
offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary authority 
to prevent deportation, immigration reforms over time 
have expanded the class of deportable offenses and 
limited the authority of judges to alleviate the harsh 
consequences of deportation. The “drastic measure” of 
deportation or removal is now virtually inevitable for a 
vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes.55  
In light of these changes, the Court considered deportation 
consequences to be “an integral part—indeed, sometimes the 
most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on 
noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”56  
The Court further noted that professional norms already 
supported the view that defense counsel was obligated to inform 
her client of the risk of deportation.57 These professional 
standards strongly indicated that counsel’s failure to inform her 
client rendered her performance ineffective, since, under 
Strickland, the evaluation of whether counsel’s performance is 
                                                 
53 Id. at 1483. 
54 See id. at 1482. 
55 Id. at 1478 (citing Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)). 
56 Id. at 1480. 
57 Id. at 1482 (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF 
GUILTY 14-3.2(f), at 116 (3d ed. 1999); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 4-5.1(a), at 197 
(3d ed. 1993); ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 13:23, at 
555, 560 (3d ed. 2004); G. NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING § 3.03, 
at 20–21 (1997); 2 INST. OF LAW & JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS 
FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS, at D10, H8–H9, J8 (2000); NAT’L LEGAL 
AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL 
REPRESENTATION § 6.2 (1995); Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, 
Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 
CORNELL L. REV. 697, 713–18 (2002)). 
 Padilla v. Kentucky 685 
constitutionally deficient is “necessarily linked to practice and 
expectations of the legal community.”58  
B. Retroactivity and the Problem of Framing 
Padilla has been lauded by many in the legal community as a 
great step towards preventing avoidable and wrongful 
deportations.59 The decision provides a new avenue of post-
conviction relief for noncitizen criminal defendants.60 Many 
courts are now struggling, however, with the question of 
whether the relief secured by Padilla is available to a defendant 
whose conviction became final before Padilla, but who is still 
awaiting the deportation resulting from that conviction. Courts 
are greatly divided on the issue of retroactivity.61 
Under Teague v. Lane—the seminal case on the retroactive 
application of new decisions dealing with constitutional criminal 
                                                 
58 Id. 
59 See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in 
Padilla v. Kentucky: The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-A-Half 
Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1463 (2011). 
60 See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From 
Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1137–51 
(2011). 
61 For cases applying Padilla retroactively, see generally United States v. 
Orocio, 645 F.3d 630 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Dass, No. CRIM. 05-
140 (3) JRT, 2011 WL 2746181 (D. Minn. July 14, 2011); Marroquin v. 
United States, No. M-10-156, 2011 WL 488985 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 
2011); Martin v. United States, No. 09-1387, 2010 WL 3463949 (C.D. Ill. 
Aug. 25, 2010); Al Kokabani v. United States, No. 5:06-CR–207-FL, 2010 
WL 3941836 (E.D.N.C. July 30, 2010); United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-
mj-040, 2010 WL 2650625 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010); Commonwealth v. 
Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892 (Mass. 2011); People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398, 
400 (Sup. Ct. 2010); Ex parte Tanklevskaya, No. 01-10-00627-CR, 2011 WL 
2132722 (Tex. Ct. App. May 26, 2011). For cases declining to apply Padilla 
retroactively, see generally United States v. Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011 
WL 3805763 (10th Cir. Aug. 30, 2011); Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 
684 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Gilbert, No. 2:03-cr-00349-WJM-1, 
2010 WL 4134286 (D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2010); State v. Truong, No. CR-96-
1681, 2010 Me. Super. LEXIS 104 (July 30, 2010); People v. Kabre, 905 
N.Y.S.2d 887 (Crim. Ct. 2010).  
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procedure62—“an old rule applies both on direct and collateral 
review, but a new rule is generally applicable only to cases that 
are still on direct review.”63 A new rule may apply retroactively, 
however, if “(1) the rule is substantive or (2) the rule is a 
‘watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure’ implicating the 
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”64 
Padilla did not place “certain kinds of primary, private 
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making 
authority to proscribe,” and therefore did not create a 
substantive rule.65 A watershed decision is one that “requires the 
observance of ‘those procedures that . . . are implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty.’”66 The exception is based on the 
idea that “time and growth in social capacity, as well as judicial 
perceptions of what we can rightly demand of the adjudicatory 
process, will [at times] properly alter our understanding of 
the bedrock procedural elements that must be found to vitiate the 
fairness of a particular conviction.”67 This exception, however, 
is very narrow68 and neither the courts nor this Note advocate its 
application to Padilla.69 The Court in Teague admitted the 
difficulty in determining whether a case announces a new rule 
but gave limited guidance, explaining that “a case announces a 
new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new 
                                                 
62 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
63 Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007).  
64 Id. (citing Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)). 
65 Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (explaining the “substantive rule” exception); 
see also State v. Gaitan, No. A-109-10, 2012 WL 612311, at *12 (N.J. Feb. 
28, 2012) (“[Padilla] does not implicate substantive criminal activity . . . .”). 
66 Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 
667, 693 (1971)). 
67 Id. (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693–94) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
68 See Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 407 (2004) (discussing the 
narrowness of Teague’s “watershed” exception). 
69 See, e.g., United States v. Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011 WL 
3805763, at *8–9 (10th Cir. Aug. 30, 2011) (finding that Padilla was not a 
watershed decision); Mathur v. United States, Nos. 7:07-CR-92-BO, 7:11-
CV-67-BO, 2011 WL 2036701, at *2 (E.D.N.C. May 24, 2011) (same); 
Doan v. United States, 760 F. Supp. 2d 602, 605–06 (E.D. Va. 2011) 
(same). 
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obligation on the States or the Federal Government,” or “if the 
result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the 
defendant’s conviction became final.”70  
Courts faced with petitions for post-conviction relief relying 
on a retroactive application of Padilla are all faced with the 
same question: Does Teague prohibit retroactive application of 
Padilla? Although the question is the same, courts are coming to 
starkly different answers; much of the variation may be 
attributed to a difference in rule framing. In the course of their 
Teague analyses, courts are framing Padilla’s rule one of two 
ways—the right to effective counsel or counsel’s requirement to 
inform clients of the potential immigration consequences. A 
court’s choice as to how to frame Padilla’s rule effectively 
determines whether a defendant will be permitted to stay in the 
country or be removed.71 
Courts rarely announce a rule in explicit terms; in fact, 
courts determining whether Padilla created a new rule for 
Teague purposes appear hesitant to directly identify what exactly 
Padilla’s rule is.72 Even in the absence of a clear announcement, 
however, the way these courts frame Padilla’s rule can be 
deduced from the language and reasoning they use.  
In Doan v. United States, the Eastern District of Virginia 
considered Justice Alito’s suggestion in his concurrence that 
defense counsel merely be required to inform clients that a 
conviction may have immigration consequences, without 
attempting to explain what those consequences may be.73 The 
Doan court described Justice Alito’s recommendation as a 
“different rule than the one adopted by the majority.”74 From 
this, it can be inferred that the Doan court interpreted Padilla’s 
                                                 
70 Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. 
71 See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 311 (1992) (“The crux of the 
analysis when Teague is invoked . . . is identification of the rule on which 
the claim for [post-conviction] relief depends.”). 
72 Certainly some courts do directly identify Padilla’s rule. See Amer v. 
United States, No. 1:06CR118-GHD, 2011 WL 2160553, at *3 (N.D. Miss. 
May 31, 2011). 
73 Doan, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 605 (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 
1473, 1488 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring)). 
74 Id. (emphasis added). 
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majority rule as requiring counsel to inform clients of the 
potential immigration consequences of a conviction. After 
framing the rule as such, the Doan court found that Padilla 
created a new rule, and was therefore not retroactive.75  
The District Court of New Jersey was clearer about what it 
determined Padilla’s rule to be in U.S. v. Gilbert.76 The Gilbert 
court concluded that the “Padilla decision requiring counsel to 
advise a non-citizen client of deportation consequences is a new 
constitutional rule and should not be applied retroactively to 
Plaintiff’s 2006 sentence.”77 Like the Doan court, the Gilbert 
court framed Padilla’s rule in a narrow, fact-specific way. The 
rule, as characterized by the Gilbert court, was a departure from 
prior case law and professional norms and was worthy of the 
“new rule” label.78 
Courts applying Padilla retroactively, on the other hand, have 
framed the rule very differently. In Commonwealth v. Clarke, for 
instance, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts found guidance in 
previous United States Supreme Court decisions explaining that the 
Strickland test “is one which of necessity requires a case-by-case 
examination of the evidence,”79 and that “application of Strickland 
in [a] novel context [does] not create [a] new rule.”80 The Clarke 
court concluded, “Padilla is not a ‘new rule’ but merely an 
application of Strickland,”81 and consequently applied retroactively 
under Teague.82 Other courts applying Padilla retroactively use 
similar reasoning, demonstrating a common choice in framing.83 
                                                 
75 Id. at 605–06. 
76 See generally United States v. Gilbert, No. 2:03-cr-00349-WJM-1, 
2010 WL 4134286 (D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2010). 
77 Id. at *3 (emphasis added). 
78 See id. (ruminating on the lack of Third Circuit or Supreme Court 
rulings on whether “an attorney must make a client aware of possible future 
immigration proceedings . . . .”). 
79 Commonwealth v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892, 900 (Mass. 2011) 
(quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 382 (2000)). 
80 Id. (quoting Osagiede v. United States, 543 F.3d 399, 408 n.4 (7th 
Cir. 2008)). 
81 Id. at 901. 
82 Id. at 904. 
83 See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398, 404 (Sup. Ct. 2010) 
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The framing in Doan and Gilbert is typical of courts that 
have declined to apply Padilla retroactively. These courts 
framed Padilla’s rule as counsel’s duty to inform clients of 
deportation consequences of pleas.84 Since this rule was not 
“dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s 
conviction became final,” it is necessarily a new rule85 and may 
not be applied retroactively unless it qualifies for one of 
Teague’s very narrow exceptions.86 In contrast, courts that have 
applied Padilla retroactively, such as the Clarke court, frame the 
rule as the right to effective counsel, as explained in 
Strickland.87 According to those courts, the right to counsel does 
not “break[] new ground or impose[] a new obligation on the 
State or Federal Government”; rather, it is an old rule88 and 
must apply retroactively. As these cases demonstrate, the way 
that a particular court frames Padilla’s rule effectively dictates 
the eventual outcome of its retroactivity analysis. 
C. Split Among the Courts 
Following Padilla, various courts have applied the Teague 
doctrine to allegations involving plea deals entered into pre-
Padilla, and have come to opposite conclusions regarding the 
retroactive application of the Padilla decision.89 This variation 
                                                 
(concluding Padilla merely “applied its Strickland precedents to a new set of 
facts”). 
84 See Doan v. United States, 760 F. Supp. 2d 602, 605 (E.D. Va. 
2011); United States v. Gilbert, No. 2:03-cr-00349-WJM-1, 2010 WL 
4134286, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2010). 
85 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989). 
86 Although a few writers advocate application of Teague’s “watershed 
rule” exception to Padilla, this view is not generally supported. See infra 
Part I.C. 
87 See, e.g., Al Kokabani v. United States, No. 5:06-CR-207-FL, 2010 
WL 3941836, at *5 (E.D.N.C. July 30, 2010); Clarke, 949 N.E.2d at 904; 
Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 400. 
88 Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. 
89 See cases cited supra note 61 (listing cases applying Padilla 
retroactively and cases not applying Padilla retroactively, all using the 
Teague retroactivity analysis). 
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may be due to a difference in framing.90 Through an examination 
of specific reasons courts have provided in their retroactivity 
analysis, it is apparent that the difference in rule framing 
pervasively dictates results. 
Courts that have applied Padilla retroactively have identified 
Padilla’s rule as the right to effective counsel, as explained in 
Strickland. Such framing produces an “old rule” for Teague 
purposes, and therefore requires retroactive application. Some 
courts have found further support for this conclusion in language 
from the Padilla opinion. Courts that have declined to apply 
Padilla retroactively have identified Padilla’s rule as counsel’s 
requirement to inform clients of the potential immigration 
consequences of a guilty plea. Such framing produces a “new 
rule” for Teague purposes, and therefore prohibits retroactive 
application. These courts have found that neither of the 
exceptions to Teague’s rule that new rules of criminal procedure 
do not apply retroactively apply to Padilla. 
The majority of opinions applying Padilla retroactively have 
found that the decision did not create a new rule.91 The Third 
Circuit took this approach in United States v. Orocio. In Orocio, 
the court held that Padilla recognized “that a plea agreement’s 
immigration consequences constitute the sort of information an 
alien defendant needs” in order to make decisions “affecting the 
outcome of the plea process.”92 Thus, according to the Orocio 
court, the requirement that counsel inform his or her client of 
immigration consequences provides nothing new, as “the Court 
had long required effective assistance of counsel on all 
‘important decisions,’ in plea bargaining that could ‘affect[] the 
                                                 
90 See supra Part I.B. 
91 See, e.g., United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 641 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(holding that Padilla “is an ‘old rule’ for Teague purposes and is 
retroactively applicable on collateral review”); Bawaneh v. United States, 
No. CV-10-7805 CAS, 2011 WL 1465775, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2011) 
(old rule); United States v. Chavarria, No. 2:10-CV-191 JVB, 2011 WL 
1336565, at *2–3 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 7, 2011) (old rule), order vacated on 
reconsideration, No. 2:10-CV-191 JVB, 2011 WL 4916568 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 
14, 2011); United States v. Diaz-Palmerin, No. 08-cr-777-3, 2011 WL 
1337326, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 2011) (old rule). 
92 Orocio, 645 F.3d at 638. 
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outcome of the plea process.’”93 The court further noted, 
“[e]very Strickland claim requires a fact-specific inquiry, but it is 
not the case that every Strickland ruling on new facts requires the 
announcement of a ‘new rule.’”94 Similarly, in United States v. 
Hubenig, the Eastern District of California noted that “[w]hen the 
Supreme Court applies a well-established rule of law in a new 
way based on the specific facts of a particular case, it does not 
generally establish a new rule.”95 The Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts, in Commonwealth v. Clarke, similarly reasoned 
that Padilla did not create a new rule, but rather had applied “an 
established constitutional standard on a case-by-case basis, 
incorporating evolving professional norms (on which the standard 
relies) to new facts.”96 In other words, these courts considered 
Padilla to have simply “applied an old rule in a new context.”97 
Courts that have found that Padilla did not create a new rule 
have, in some instances, also had to grapple with the fact that 
Padilla overruled precedent in their jurisdiction,98 which 
opponents of Padilla’s retroactive application argue shows that 
“the result [of Padilla] was not dictated by precedent existing at 
the time the defendant’s conviction became final,” and is 
therefore a new rule under the limited guidance of Teague.99 
Addressing that argument in Hubenig, the Eastern District of 
California found the existence of conflicting precedent “not 
dispositive of whether [Padilla] established a new rule for 
Teague purposes,” because “the standard for determining when 
a case establishes a new rule is ‘objective,’ and the mere 
                                                 
93 Id. (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). 
94 Id. at 640. 
95 United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-MJ-040, 2010 WL 2650625, at *5 
(E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010). 
96 Commonwealth v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892, 903 (Mass. 2011). 
97 People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398, 403 (Sup. Ct. 2010). 
98 See Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(“Prior to Padilla, the lower federal courts, including at least nine Courts of 
Appeals, had uniformly held that the Sixth Amendment did not require 
counsel to provide advice concerning any collateral (as opposed to direct) 
consequences of a guilty plea.”). 
99 See id. at 688–91. 
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existence of conflicting authority does not necessarily mean a rule 
is new.”100 Other courts have responded in a similar fashion.101 
Courts that have found that Padilla relief should not be made 
retroactively available to defendants whose conviction pre-dates 
Padilla have argued that the decision created a new rule.102 In 
United States v. Chapa, the Northern District of Georgia found 
that Padilla’s result “was not dictated by precedent existing at 
the time [that a pre-Padilla defendant’s] conviction became 
final,” because existing precedent nation-wide “dictated the 
opposite result.”103 Additionally, in United States v. Perez, the 
District of Nebraska pointed out that it was not the “prevailing 
professional norm” to inform a defendant of immigration 
consequences of his guilty plea.104 
Other courts have cited Alito’s concurrence and Scalia’s 
dissent in Padilla as support for classifying Padilla as having 
announced a new rule. For instance, in Mendoza v. United 
States, the Eastern District of Virginia pointed to the very 
existence of Padilla’s concurrence (by Justice Alito) and dissent 
(by Justice Scalia) as evidence of a new rule.105 The court 
highlighted language from Justice Alito’s opinion, noting that the 
majority “effectively overruled ‘the longstanding and unanimous 
position of the federal courts . . . that reasonable defense 
counsel generally need only advise a client about the direct 
                                                 
100 Hubenig, 2010 WL 2650625, at *7 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 
U.S. 362, 410 (2000)). 
101 See, e.g., Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 404 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 
410; Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 304 (1992)); Ex parte Tanklevskaya, 
No. 01-10-00627-CR, 2011 WL 2132722, at *6–7 (Tex. Ct. App. May 26, 
2011). 
102 E.g., Dennis v. United States, 787 F. Supp. 2d 425, 427–30 (D.S.C. 
2011); Mendoza v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 2d 791, 797 (E.D. Va. 
2011); Banos v. United States, No. 10-23314-CIV, 2011 WL 835789, at *2 
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2011); Doan v. United States, 760 F. Supp. 2d 602, 605–
06 (E.D. Va. 2011); United States v. Perez, No. 8:02CR296, 2010 WL 
4643033, at *2 (D. Neb. Nov. 9, 2010). 
103 United States v. Chapa, 800 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1221 (N.D. Ga. 2011) 
(citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989)). 
104 Perez, 2010 WL 4643033, at *2 (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 
510, 521 (2003)). 
105 Mendoza, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 797. 
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consequences of a criminal conviction.’”106 Similarly, in United 
States v. Chang Hong, the Tenth Circuit determined that Padilla 
created a new rule, finding support for their conclusion in 
Justice Scalia’s argument that, before Padilla, the Supreme 
Court “had limited the Sixth Amendment to advice directly 
related to defense against criminal prosecutions,” and does not 
require advice on collateral consequences of convictions.107 
These separate opinions, these courts argue, show that 
“reasonable jurists did not find the rule in Padilla compelled or 
dictated by the Court’s prior precedent.”108 
A few academics have taken the position that Padilla created 
a new rule, but that it qualifies for retroactive application under 
the “watershed decision” exception to Teague.109 They reason 
that, without Padilla’s requirement to inform a defendant of the 
deportation consequences of his guilty plea, innocent defendants 
who are pessimistic about their chances at trial will be more 
likely to submit false guilty pleas in exchange for favorable plea 
bargains.110 Thus, “the likelihood of an accurate criminal 
conviction is seriously diminished.”111 The watershed exception 
is extremely narrow,112 however, and the majority of courts that 
have found that Padilla created a new rule have refused to 
classify it as watershed rule.113 
                                                 
106 Id. (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1487 (2010) 
(Alito, J., concurring)). 
107 United States v. Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011 WL 3805763, at *6 
(10th Cir. Aug. 30, 2011) (quoting Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1494–95 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting)). 
108 Id.; Mendoza, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 797. 
109 See Bibas, supra note 60, at 1137–51; John L. Holahan & Shauna 
Faye Kieffer, Padilla Motions Effective Assistance of Counsel Where Pleas 
Mandate Deportation, BENCH & B. MINN., Aug. 2010, at 25, 26. 
110 See Holahan & Kieffer, supra note 109. 
111 Id. at 27. 
112 See Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 407 (2004) (“[The Supreme 
Court] has repeatedly emphasized the limited scope of the . . . exception—for 
‘watershed rules of criminal procedure . . .’—which ‘is clearly meant to 
apply only to a small core of rules requiring observance of those procedures 
that . . . are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” (citations omitted) 
(quoting O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 157 (1997))). 
113 E.g., United States v. Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011 WL 3805763, 
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Courts that have held that Padilla created a new rule, before 
declining to apply it retroactively, have had to determine that it 
is not a “watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating the 
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal 
proceedings.”114 In Chang Hong, the court pointed out the 
narrowness of the “watershed” exception, and noted that “the 
[Supreme] Court has rejected every attempt to fit a case within 
the exception.”115 In Llanes v. United States, the Middle District 
of Florida found that Padilla’s requirement that counsel provide 
immigration advice is less significant than what the Supreme 
Court envisioned as qualifying as a watershed rule.116 These 
courts, and many others, have found that Padilla does not “alter 
[the Court’s] understanding of bedrock procedural elements 
essential to the fairness of a proceeding,”117 and, therefore, does 
not qualify for Teague’s exception to the general rule that new 
rules of criminal procedure do not apply retroactively.118 
Although the Padilla Court did not make an explicit holding 
on retroactivity,119 many lower courts interpreting Padilla have 
pointed to certain language in the Supreme Court’s opinion to 
                                                 
at *8–9 (10th Cir. Aug. 30, 2011); Mathur v. United States, Nos. 7:07-CR-
92-BO, 7:11-CV-67-BO, 2011 WL 2036701, at *2 (E.D.N.C. May 24, 
2011); Doan v. United States, 760 F. Supp. 2d 602, 605–06 (E.D. Va. 
2011). 
114 Llanes v. United States, No. 8:11-CV-682-T-23TBM, 2011 WL 
2473233, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 22, 2011) (quoting United States v. 
Swindall, 107 F.3d 831, 835 (11th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Under Teague, even new rules apply retroactively if they constitute 
watershed rules of criminal procedure. See infra Part II.A. 
115 Chang Hong, 2011 WL 3805763, at *8. 
116 Llanes, 2011 WL 2473233, at *2 (noting Padilla’s notification 
requirement is “far different from Gideon’s establishment of the right to 
counsel”). 
117 Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 418 (2007) (quoting Tyler v. 
Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 665 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
118 See, e.g., Doan v. United States, 760 F. Supp. 2d 602, 605–06 (E.D. 
Va. 2011). 
119 Absence of an explicit holding of retroactivity by the Supreme Court 
does not indicate the Court does not intend retroactive application, as the 
Court may “[establish] principles of retroactivity and [leave] the application 
of those principles to lower courts.” Tyler, 533 U.S. at 663. 
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support its retroactive application.120 Most persuasive, perhaps, 
has been the Court’s response to the Solicitor General’s concern 
that its decision would open the “floodgates.”121 The Court 
stated: 
It seems unlikely that our decision today will have a 
significant effect on those convictions already obtained as 
the result of plea bargains. For at least the past 15 years, 
professional norms have generally imposed an obligation 
on counsel to provide advice on the deportation 
consequences of a client’s plea.122 
According to the court in Hubenig, the Supreme Court’s 
“floodgates” discussion “signaled that it understood its holding 
in Padilla would apply retroactively.”123 If the Supreme Court 
did not intend retroactive application of Padilla, the Hubenig 
court reasoned, the “floodgates” discussion would have been 
unnecessary.124 Likewise, in People v. Garcia, the Kings County 
Supreme Court noted the Supreme Court’s treatment of the 
“floodgate” issue was “reason[] in [itself] to apply Padilla 
retroactively.”125 
II. THE NEED FOR RETROACTIVE APPLICATION 
Defendants have very few feasible options following a denial 
of collateral post-conviction relief; thus, collateral proceedings 
become paramount. In cases where courts determine that Padilla 
may not be applied retroactively to finalized convictions, 
petitioners may theoretically still have recourse through a 
petition for habeas corpus.126 In reality, however, the “great 
                                                 
120 See, e.g., United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 
2650625, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010); People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 
398, 402 (Sup. Ct. 2010). 
121 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1484–85 (2010). 
122 Id. 
123 Hubenig, 2010 WL 2650625, at *7. 
124 Id.; see also People v. De Jesus, 30 Misc. 3d 1203(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2010) (unpublished table decision). 
125 Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 402. 
126 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2006). 
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writ” is unlikely to provide relief in these cases.127 In order to 
obtain habeas relief, except in extraordinary cases,128 a petitioner 
must first exhaust all remedies available in state court.129 This 
may include a variety of collateral attacks available through state 
statutes.130 Additionally, AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of 
limitations for filing habeas petitions.131 The statute begins 
running when a defendant’s judgment becomes final by the 
conclusion of direct review.132 Furthermore, individuals may be 
deported before their habeas petitions are reviewed,133 and in 
such cases, are often barred from habeas relief.134 Thus, “few 
                                                 
127 See Margaret Colgate Love & Gabriel J. Chin, Padilla v. Kentucky: 
The Right to Counsel and the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, 
CHAMPION, May 2010, at 20, available at http://www.pardonlaw.com/ 
materials/love-chin_may_feature.pdf. 
128 See, e.g., Lee v. Stickman, 357 F.3d 338, 343–44 (3d Cir. 
2004) (exhaustion requirement excused because unresolved petition 
challenging conviction pended in state court for eight years). But see, e.g., 
Williams v. Sims, 390 F.3d 958, 963 (7th Cir. 2004) (exhaustion 
requirement not excused though state delayed because petitioner’s habeas 
petition was untimely). 
129 § 2254(b)(1)(A). 
130 See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10 (McKinney 2005) 
(motion to vacate judgment). 
131 § 2244(d)(1). AEDPA additionally greatly restricts habeas relief by 
limiting it to cases that have been adjudicated in state court “contrary to, or 
[in] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 2254(d)(1). See 
generally Ursula Bentele, The Not So Great Writ: Trapped in the Narrow 
Holdings of Supreme Court Precedents, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 741 
(2010). 
132 § 2244(d)(1)(A). If a defendant unsuccessfully petitions for certiorari 
in the highest state court or the Supreme Court of the United States, his 
petition becomes “final by the conclusion of direct review” on the day 
certiorari is denied, with that day counting as the first day of the one-year 
limitation. Lisa L. Bellamy, Playing for Time: The Need for Equitable Tolling 
of the Habeas Corpus Statute of Limitations, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 13 
(2004). 
133 See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(3)(B) (1999) (“Service of the petition on the officer or employee 
does not stay the removal of an alien pending the court’s decision on the 
petition, unless the court orders otherwise.”). 
134 Some courts find petitions from deported individuals are moot. See, 
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will navigate this procedural minefield successfully.”135 
Therefore, for defendants seeking the protection of Padilla, 
post-conviction challenges may provide the last chance to avoid 
deportation. 
Additionally, there may be a substantial length of time 
between when a noncitizen’s criminal conviction becomes final 
and the time he or she is removed. There is a tremendous 
backlog of cases in immigration courts.136 In September 2011, 
297,551 cases were pending in immigration courts,137 24,661 of 
which involved individuals rendered deportable by criminal 
convictions.138 The average length of time criminal immigration 
cases had been pending was 403 days.139 The wait in some 
courts, however, is significantly longer.140 The time courts take 
to render decisions is also very long. Courts took, on average, 
166 days to render removal decisions issued in September 
2011.141 Immigration courts in New York City took an average 
                                                 
e.g., Sule v. INS, No. 98-1090, 1999 WL 668716, at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 27, 
1999). For a discussion on the permissibility of habeas review for deported 
individuals, however, see Alison Leal Parker, Note, In Through the Out 
Door? Retaining Judicial Review for Deported Lawful Permanent Resident 
Aliens, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (2001). 
135 Love & Chin, supra note 127, at 20. 
136 See Leni B. Benson & Russell R. Wheeler, Taking Steps to Enhance 
Quality and Timeliness in Immigration Removal Adjudication 31 (Jan. 12, 
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.acus.gov/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2012/01/ACUS-Immigration-Removal-
Adjudication-Draft-Report-1_12_12.pdf (discussing the increase in “per judge 
workload” and the resulting backlog in immigration courts). 
137 Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRAC IMMIGR., http://trac.syr.edu/ 
phptools/immigration/court_backlog/ (select “Pending Cases” under “What to 
graph”; then select “All Charges” under “Charge Type”) (last visited Feb. 
24, 2012). 
138 Id. (select “Pending Cases” under “What to graph”; then select 
“Criminal/Nat. Sec./Terror” under “Charge Type”). The number of pending 
criminal immigration cases also includes individuals allegedly deportable on 
national security or terrorism grounds. Id. 
139 Id. (select “Average Days” under “What to tabulate”; then select 
“Criminal/Nat. Sec./Terror” under “Charge Type”). 
140 In Los Angeles, for example, criminal immigration cases pending in 
September 2011 had been pending, on average, for 699 days. Id. 
141 Immigration Court Processing Time by Outcome, TRAC IMMIGR., 
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of 623 days to process removal decisions.142 This data reveals 
that criminal immigration proceedings often involve convictions 
finalized more than a year and a half earlier, and in some cities, 
such as New York and Los Angeles, three or more years 
earlier. Thus, the potential class of claimants affected by the 
retroactivity of Padilla remains huge. 
The following section explains why an accurate application 
of Padilla requires courts to frame its rule as the right to 
effective counsel. Courts inaccurately framing the rule as 
counsel’s requirement to inform clients of the potential 
immigration consequences improperly deny petitioners access to 
Padilla’s benefits.  
A. Courts Must Frame Padilla’s Rule as the Right to 
Effective Counsel, as explained in Strickland 
A proper application of Padilla requires courts to frame 
Padilla’s rule as the right to effective counsel, and thereby apply 
the decision retroactively. Strickland is a rule of general 
application, which is seldom likely to create a “new rule” for 
Teague purposes. While application of Strickland to new facts 
may yield a novel result, as was the case in Padilla, such a 
result does imply creation of a “new rule.” Rather, a case’s 
fact-specific novel result may be its holding, which courts 
should not mistake for the case’s broader rule.  
1. A Rule of General Application 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito claimed that the 
imposition of a duty to inform clients of immigration 
consequences “marks a major upheaval in Sixth Amendment 
                                                 
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/court_proctime_outco
me.php (select “Average Days” under “What to tabulate”; then select 
“Removals” under “Outcome Type”) (last visited Feb. 24, 2012). This 
measures the average number of days between the recorded filing date and 
the date the case was closed. About the Data, TRAC IMMIGR., 
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/about_data.html (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2012). 
142 Immigration Court Processing Time by Outcome, supra note 141. 
 Padilla v. Kentucky 699 
law,”143 and pointed out an absence of precedent “holding that 
criminal defense counsel’s failure to provide advice concerning 
the removal consequences of a criminal conviction violates a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”144 Several courts 
have pointed to this language as evidence that Padilla created a 
new rule.145 This reasoning, however, ignores the nature of 
Strickland’s inquiry into whether counsel’s performance was 
constitutionally effective.  
Strickland calls for a fact-centered analysis, requiring “a 
case-by-case examination of the evidence . . . .”146 It created a 
rule of general application, “establish[ing] a broad and flexible 
standard for the review of an attorney’s performance in a variety 
of factual circumstances.”147 In his concurring opinion in Wright 
v. West, Justice Kennedy explained the unlikelihood of a rule of 
general application creating a new rule for Teague purposes: “If 
the rule in question is one which of necessity requires a case-by-
case examination of the evidence, then we can tolerate a number 
of specific applications without saying that those applications 
themselves create a new rule . . . .”148 Justice Kennedy made it 
clear that, in the application of such rules, “it will be the 
infrequent case that yields a result so novel that it forges a new 
rule, one not dictated by precedent.”149 Therefore, rules that rely 
on case-by-case examinations, such as Strickland, may be 
applied in a variety of circumstances without establishing a new 
rule for Teague purposes.150  
                                                 
143 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1491 (2010) (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
144 Id. 
145 See, e.g., United States v. Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011 WL 
3805763, at *6 (10th Cir. Aug. 30, 2011); Sarria v. United States, No. 11-
20730-CIV, 2011 WL 4949724, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2011); Mendoza v. 
United States, 774 F. Supp. 2d 791, 797 (E.D. Va. 2011). 
146 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) (quoting Wright v. 
West, 505 U.S. 277, 308 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
147 Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 1162, 1197 (11th Cir. 2008). 
148 Wright, 505 U.S. at 308 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
149 Id. at 309. 
150 Id. at 308–09. 
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Justice Kennedy’s point is well illustrated by several 
Supreme Court decisions applying Strickland to various fact 
patterns, none of which have been deemed to have created a 
new rule for Teague purposes.151 In Williams v. Taylor, the 
Court applied Strickland to determine that counsel’s failure to 
introduce known evidence regarding defendant’s borderline 
mental retardation and troubled childhood constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel.152 Three years later, in Wiggins v. Smith,153 
the Court applied Strickland to counsels’ failure to investigate 
their defendant’s dysfunctional background, finding such conduct 
to constitute ineffective assistance.154 Yet again, in Rompilla v. 
Beard,155 the Court applied Strickland to find that defense 
counsel’s failure to sufficiently investigate aggravating factors in 
the sentencing phase of a defendant’s capital murder trial 
constituted ineffective assistance, despite suggestions by the 
defendant’s family that mitigating factors were not present.156 
Despite the fact that these cases created or imposed on defense 
counsel a set of increased obligations, not one of the cases has 
been found to have created a new rule. They are, rather, 
applications of Strickland’s articulation of the right to effective 
counsel, which “can hardly be said [to]. . . ‘break[s] new 
ground or impose[s] a new obligation on the States.’”157 
Padilla is another in a long line of Strickland cases applying 
an old rule of general application to new circumstances: 
counsel’s failure to inform a client of deportation consequences 
following significant changes in immigration law.158 Padilla’s 
                                                 
151 See Al Kokabani v. United States, No. 5:06-CR-207-FL, 2010 WL 
3941836, at *4 (E.D.N.C. July 30, 2010). 
152 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000). 
153 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
154 Id. at 523–27. 
155 Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005). 
156 Id. at 383. 
157 Williams, 529 U.S. at 391 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 
301 (1989)). 
158 See supra Part I (discussing the changes to immigration law brought 
by AEDPA and IIRIRA); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 
1480 (2010) (“[AEDPA and IIRIRA’s] changes to our immigration law have 
dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen’s criminal conviction.”). 
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pronouncement that an attorney’s failure to inform his or her 
client of a plea’s deportation consequences constitutes ineffective 
counsel159 may have differed from any previous applications of 
Strickland, but considering the nature of Strickland inquiries, did 
not establish a new rule. Some courts have argued that Padilla’s 
application of Strickland is exceptional, as it imposes a duty on 
defense counsel to advise on collateral consequences.160 As the 
Court noted in Padilla, however, “[w]e . . . have never applied 
a distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define 
the scope of constitutionally ‘reasonable professional assistance’ 
required under Strickland.”161 Padilla simply involved another 
instance of the familiar pattern of a rule of general application: 
an old rule applied to new facts, yielding new results. 
2. Wide Rules, Narrow Holdings 
Courts framing Padilla’s rule as counsel’s requirement to 
inform clients of immigration consequences of a conviction may 
be failing to distinguish the case’s “rule” from its holding. 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “legal ruling” as “a ruling on 
a point of law . . . reached by the judge as a necessary step in 
the decision,”162 and a holding as “1. A court’s determination of 
a matter of law pivotal to its decision,” and “2. A ruling on 
evidence or other questions presented at trial.”163 Although these 
may sound similar, there are meaningful differences between the 
two.164 A holding is attached to a particular case, and is often 
fact-specific.165 Rules, on the other hand, can be synthesized 
                                                 
159 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. 
160 See, e.g., United States v. Laguna, No. 10 CR 342, 2011 WL 
1357538, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2011). 
161 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 689 (1984)). 
162 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 629 (3d pocket ed. 2006). 
163 Id. at 331. 
164 David H. Tennant, The Hazards of Over-Selling: Ipse Dixits and 
Other Unsubstantiated Arguments, FOR DEF., Aug. 2006, at 72, 72. 
165 Bentele, supra note 131, at 744 (“[D]efining the holding of a case is 
less straightforward; those seeking to expand the reach of a precedent will 
characterize the decision broadly, while one who disapproves of the previous 
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from multiple cases,166 and, therefore, often have wider or more 
general application than holdings. Particularly in the context of 
Teague’s retroactivity analysis, “rules of law may be sufficiently 
clear for habeas purposes even when they are expressed in terms 
of a generalized standard rather than as a bright-line rule.”167 
With this framework in mind, it appears reasonable, if not 
necessary, to characterize Padilla’s rule as the more general 
principle of “the right to counsel,” and its holding as the more 
fact-specific principle that counsel’s failure to inform clients of 
deportation consequences constitutes ineffective assistance. 
The difference between a case’s holding and its rule for 
Teague purposes is well illustrated in Lewis v. Johnson.168 In 
1987, Charles Lewis pled guilty to six counts of robbery and 
nine other criminal offenses in the Pennsylvania Court of 
Common Pleas, and was sentenced to thirty to sixty years in 
prison.169 In the eight years following his conviction, Lewis filed 
two petitions in Pennsylvania state court for post-conviction 
relief, alleging that his court-appointed trial counsel was 
ineffective on a number of grounds, including for failing to file 
a direct appeal.170 Both petitions were denied.171 The court found 
that relief was precluded by Pennsylvania case law that had held 
“trial counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to file a 
direct appeal when not requested to do so.”172 In August 2000, 
Lewis filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, but his petition 
was denied.173 Lewis appealed, relying on Roe v. Flores-
Ortega,174 decided by the Supreme Court two months before he 
had filed his habeas petition,175 in which the Court used the 
                                                 
outcome will narrow it to its specific facts.”). 
166 Tennant, supra note 164, at 72. 
167 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 382 (2000). 
168 Lewis v. Johnson, 359 F.3d 646 (3d Cir. 2004). 
169 Id. at 649. 
170 Id. at 650–51. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 650. 
173 Id. at 651. 
174 Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000). 
175 Lewis, 359 F.3d at 651. 
 Padilla v. Kentucky 703 
Strickland test to find that “counsel had a constitutionally imposed 
duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal when there is 
reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant would want to 
appeal . . . or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably 
demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing.”176  
Since Flores-Ortega was decided after Lewis’ conviction 
became final, the Third Circuit conducted a Teague analysis to 
determine whether the decision applied retroactively.177 The 
court framed Flores-Ortega’s rule as “the Strickland standard,” 
and, thus, found it to be an “old rule,” which applied 
retroactively.178 Applying the Flores-Ortega decision to Lewis’ 
case, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded, instructing the 
district court to grant Lewis’ petition conditioned upon the 
Commonwealth’s reinstatement of his right of first appeal.179 The 
court characterized Flores-Ortega as holding that “criminal 
defense attorneys have a constitutional duty to consult and advise 
defendants of their appellate rights.”180 Although this holding 
was contrary to state case law, the court properly recognized 
that Strickland, as a rule of general application, may produce 
novel results, but is, by no means, a new rule.181 It further noted 
that “case law need not exist on all fours to allow for a finding 
under Teague that the rule at issue was dictated by Supreme 
Court precedent.”182 Had the court mistaken Flores-Ortega’s 
holding (criminal defense attorneys have a constitutional duty to 
advise defendants of their appellate rights) for its rule (the right 
to effective counsel), Lewis would probably not have found 
habeas relief.  
In the last fifteen years, it has become even more important 
that courts differentiate between rules and holdings during 
Teague retroactivity inquiries. In addition to imposing a one-
                                                 
176 Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 480. 
177 Lewis, 359 F.3d at 652–57. 
178 See id. at 655 (“Flores-Ortega’s application of the Strickland standard 
was dictated by precedent and merely clarified the law as it applied to the 
particular facts of that case.”). 
179 Id. at 662. 
180 Id. at 652. 
181 Id. at 655. 
182 Id. 
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year statute of limitations on habeas filing,183 AEDPA has greatly 
limited the claims on which relief may be granted.184 AEDPA 
included an amendment to the habeas corpus statutes providing: 
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf 
of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 
State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim 
that was adjudicated on the merits in State court 
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim— 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States . . . .185 
In recent years, “clearly established Federal law, as determined 
by the Supreme Court” has been interpreted as Supreme Court 
holdings,186 and often in a manner narrowly tailored to the facts 
of the case.187 Thus, unless a habeas petitioner presents a claim 
with a substantially similar fact pattern as a case previously 
decided by the Supreme Court, district courts will likely find 
that the state court conviction was not “contrary to” or “an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law”188 
and that habeas relief, therefore, cannot be granted.189  
However, a small oasis in this restricted habeas 
jurisprudence may be found for petitioners relying on decisions 
announced after their convictions became final. In Williams v. 
Taylor, the Supreme Court stated, “whatever would qualify as 
an old rule under our Teague jurisprudence will constitute 
‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
                                                 
183 See supra Part II (discussing AEDPA’s statute of limitations for filing 
petitions for habeas corpus). 
184 See Stefan Ellis, Gonzalez v. Crosby and the Use of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 60(b) in Habeas Proceedings, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 207, 
208 (2010). 
185 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-132, tit. 1, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218–19 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(d)(1) (2006)). AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Id.  
186 Bentele, supra note 131, at 741. 
187 See id. at 751–54. 
188 § 2254(d)(1)–(2). 
189 Bentele, supra note 131, at 746. 
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Court of the United States’ under [AEDPA].”190 According to 
this instruction, if a habeas petitioner relies on a Supreme Court 
decision announced after his conviction became final, and if the 
court entertaining the petition finds the rule of the relied upon 
case is old, the petitioner may reap the benefits of the case even 
if the facts of his case are not substantially similar. In contrast, 
if the same petitioner relied on the same Supreme Court case, 
but the case had been decided before his conviction became 
final, he could only realize the protections of its holding, which 
might require the facts of the two cases to be substantially 
similar. It appears that retroactively applied decisions may offer 
wider habeas relief. When a court mistakes a holding for a rule 
in its Teague analysis, however, it extinguishes this opportunity.  
Courts that have declined to apply Padilla retroactively failed 
to appreciate Strickland’s nature as a rule of general applicability. 
These courts inaccurately identified Padilla’s rule, perhaps 
confusing it with the case’s holding. Their incorrect application of 
Padilla deprived petitioners of what may have been their last 
opportunity to maintain their lives in the United States. 
B. Alternatively, State Courts Should Use Their Power Under 
Danforth v. Minnesota to Give Broader Effect to New 
Rules 
A proper appreciation for the Strickland rule’s nature as a rule 
of general application, as well as for the distinction between 
Padilla’s “rule” and its “holding,” compel courts to frame 
Padilla’s rule as the right to effective counsel—an old rule which 
thus requires retroactive application.191 State courts that remain 
unconvinced, however, have an alternative means by which they 
may give Padilla retroactive effect. Even after concluding that 
Padilla created a new rule, and that it therefore does not apply 
retroactively under Teague, state courts may give Padilla 
retroactive effect through their power under Danforth v. 
Minnesota.192 
                                                 
190 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000) (quoting § 2254(d)(1)).  
191 See supra Part II.A. 
192 Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008). 
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The Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Danforth v. 
Minnesota greatly altered retroactivity jurisprudence.193 The 
Court examined “whether Teague constrains the authority of 
state courts to give broader effect to new rules of criminal 
procedure than is required by that opinion.”194 The majority 
concluded that it did not; instead, according to the Court, 
Teague “limits the kinds of constitutional violations that will 
entitle an individual to relief on federal habeas, but does not in 
any way limit the authority of a state court, when reviewing its 
own state criminal convictions, to provide a remedy for a 
violation that is deemed ‘nonretroactive’ under Teague.”195 Thus, 
under Danforth, a state may design its own retroactivity 
standards for federal constitutional rules in excess of the federal 
minimum set by Teague.196 State courts have already begun using 
their power under Danforth to design their own retroactivity 
principles.197 
In the Padilla context, if the highest state court determines 
that Padilla created a new rule, and is thus not retroactively 
applicable under Teague, the court may apply its own 
retroactivity principles in a manner allowing for retroactive 
application of Padilla. Padilla applications provide a perfect 
opportunity for state courts to revise their retroactivity principles 
in a way that provides greater post-conviction relief in the wake 
of AEDPA’s constriction of federal habeas relief.198  
                                                 
193 See generally Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague 
Retroactivity, or “Redressability,” After Danforth v. Minnesota: Why Lower 
Courts Should Give Retroactive Effect to New Constitutional Rules of 
Criminal Procedure in Postconviction Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 
(2009). 
194 Danforth, 552 U.S. at 266. 
195 Id. at 282. 
196 Id. at 288. 
197 See, e.g., State v. Jess, 184 P.3d 133, 154 n.20 (Haw. 2008) 
(declining to follow Teague); Morris v. State, No. W2008–01449–CCA–R3–
PC, 2010 WL 3970371, at *23 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 11, 2010) 
(recognizing conflict, but deferring to Teague until state Supreme Court 
determines the issue). 
198 See supra Part II. 
 Padilla v. Kentucky 707 
C. Finality Interests 
Since “retroactive application may affect defendants whose 
trials are long since over,” it involves important finality 
concerns.199 These concerns are especially relevant in the 
retroactive application of Padilla, which may affect a large 
number of final convictions. In Barrios Cruz v. State, the court 
concluded that a retroactive application of Padilla “would 
undermine the perceived and actual finality of criminal 
judgments,” and declined to apply Padilla retroactively.200 Many 
other courts express similar finality concerns.201 
However, applying Padilla retroactively will not significantly 
hamper interests of finality, because defendants permitted to 
benefit from Padilla still face a significant hurdle. A successful 
claim of ineffective counsel under Strickland requires that a 
defendant prove not only that his counsel’s performance was 
deficient, but also that he was prejudiced by the deficient 
performance.202  
In Padilla, the majority “[gave] serious consideration to the 
concerns . . . regarding the importance of protecting the finality 
of convictions obtained through guilty pleas,” but explained, 
“[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task . . . . 
[T]o obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must 
convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain 
would have been rational under the circumstances.”203 The 
majority predicted that “lower courts—now quite experienced 
with applying Strickland—[could] effectively and efficiently use 
its framework to separate specious claims from those with 
substantial merit.”204 This prediction appears to have been 
                                                 
199 Ellen E. Boshkoff, Resolving Retroactivity After Teague v. Lane, 65 
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accurate, as some courts have applied Padilla retroactively, but 
found that claims did not warrant relief because defendants 
failed to show prejudice.205 Others avoided the retroactivity 
analysis altogether by first determining that a defendant was not 
prejudiced.206 Accurate application of Strickland’s prejudice 
requirement ensures that retroactive application of Padilla will 
only disturb the finality of meritorious claims.  
CONCLUSION 
Certain criminal acts render a lawful permanent resident 
deportable in an instant.207 Even misdemeanors, such as 
possession of thirty-one grams of marijuana208 or distribution of 
obscene material,209 can lead to removal.210 The Padilla Court 
carefully considered the “[changing] landscape of federal 
immigration law” and recognized that “deportation is an integral 
part . . . of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen 
defendants.”211 Based on these considerations, it found that an 
attorney has a duty to advise her client of deportation 
consequences of a guilty plea, and failure to do so is grounds for 
a claim of ineffective counsel.212 
Padilla was a victory for many, but that victory was 
diminished by some jurisdictions’ refusal to apply Padilla 
retroactively.213 The stark division among courts as to whether 
                                                 
205 See, e.g., Al Kokabani v. United States, No. 5:06–CR–207–FL, 2010 
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Padilla created a new rule for Teague purposes, and thus could 
not be applied retroactively, effectively leaves a noncitizen 
defendant’s fate to the happenstance of his or her location of 
conviction.214 Courts that have found that Padilla created a new 
rule did so because they framed Padilla’s rule as an attorney’s 
duty to provide immigration advice.215 Framing the rule in this 
way, however, ignores Strickland’s nature as a rule of general 
application, as well as the distinction between Padilla’s rule and 
holding.216 By mischaracterizing Padilla’s rule, courts not only 
apply Padilla inaccurately, but they also miss an opportunity to 
correct great harm to uninformed or ill-informed noncitizen 
defendants and the families and communities from which they 
are removed.217 In contrast, framing Padilla’s rule as the right to 
effective counsel allows courts to address these harms without 
greatly disturbing interests of finality.218 State courts have the 
additional option of giving Padilla retroactive effect, even if 
they find it “nonretroactive” under Teague.219 Padilla has the 
potential to be a victory for accuracy and fairness in criminal 
proceedings, but it is up to the courts to fulfill its promise. 
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